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INTRODUCTION: THE CRISIS 
The foreign ministers of Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico 
met on the Panamanian island of Contadora January 8-9, 1983 to launch 
an effort aimed at persuading the states of Central America to make peace 
with each other and with their guerrillas. Internal wars had raged in 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua since the early 1970s—intensifying 
since 1979, abetted by external intervention by the superpowers and their 
allies—and an uncertain peace had prevailed in Honduras. The leadership 
of the guerrillas generally professed a commitment to Marxism-Leninism, 
though some had been attracted by Liberation Theology, and their 
political-military organizations maintained strong links with Cuba and 
other Communist Party states as well as the Latin American and European 
left. A sizeable Cuban presence was evident in Nicaragua after July 1979, 
accompanied by professions of Marxism-Lenimsm by several members of 
the Sandinista leadership. Just across the border in Honduras an im-
pressive U.S. military presence was seemingly permanently ensconced, ex-
plained by the staging of repeated maneuvers, the longest in U.S. history. 
Moreover, after November 1981 the United States was sponsoring an in-
itially covert war in Nicaragua using Nicaraguan exiles and refugees, based 
primarily in Honduras and secondarily in Costa Rica, against the revolu-
tionary regime. Public protestations aside, the obvious implication was 
that the governments of Honduras and Nicaragua accepted the presence of 
the "contras" and the correctness of U.S. strategy vis à vis Managua. 
By 1983, just as the Contadora effort was commencing, domestic 
divisions over U.S. Central American policy led the administration of 
President Ronald Reagan to summon a bipartisan commission, headed by 
Henry Kissinger, to prepare an agenda that might calm the debate at home 
and rally more Democrats to the President's side. The Kissinger Commis-
sion completed its report by year's end, providing the outline for future 
administration policy including massive aid recommendations and 
lukewarm support for the Nicaraguan Contras. U.S. aid had escalated 
after 1979, reaching levels unprecedented in the history of American rela-
tions with Central America. Economic aid outstripped military aid by the 
ratio of roughly three-to-one. As the states of the Isthmus increased their 
dependence upon U.S. largesse, the influence of the "Colossus to the 
North" increased accordingly.1 
The Contadora "Process" which resulted from the foreign ministers' 
first meeting in January 1983 attempted to address all of the issues raised 
by the conflicts in Central America and most importantly, revealed a 
tenacity which no one could have predicted at the outset. The effort pro-
duced three treaty drafts by 1986, by which time the parties who were 
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the object of this peaceful "intervention" had begun to expose and ad-
dress the tough issues which had to be resolved if the Contadora effort 
was to succeed. 
The case under study involves one group of states—the Contadora 
Four—attempting to end internal rebellion and external intervention and 
regulate relations among a second set of states—those of the Central 
American Isthmus—in the interests of all concerned, including the super-
powers. Lessons to be derived from this multilateral effort revolve 
around the difficulty of such a thankless undertaking; efforts of this sort 
may be "predestined" to fail. Third parties may be unable to initiate 
negotiations between contending states suffering internal war and exter-
nal interventions aimed at intensifying war. When the states attempting 
the effort have prestige but little material weight in the region (only Mex-
ico was a major oil supplier, for example), they are in no position to 
force a decision. Bargaining between intermediaries is at best only a poor 
substitute for negotiations between rival actors. 
CENTRAL AMERICAN INTERESTS: THE STATES OF THE 
ISTHMUS 
A number of nations had a special interest in the outcome of the 
conflicts in Central America. The U.S. saw the hand of the Soviet Union 
and of Cuba at work in the guerrilla wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, 
and since 1979 in the revolutionary government of Nicaragua. America 
resented outside interference in its traditional sphere of influence and 
feared the potential for exporting revolution commanded by the San-
dinista government. 
For Guatemala, which, after 1982, was in the process of restoring 
democracy, there was the danger that Managua's Sandinista National 
Liberation Front (FSLN) regime and the Cubans might provide addi-
tional support for the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UR-
NG) guerrillas. As if to pacify the Nicaraguans, Guatemala pursued a 
neutral policy, a policy unique in the region and all the more suprising 
given the military nature of the Guatemalan government for most of the 
period following the launching of Contadora. The dictatorship of 
General Oscar Mejia Victores gave way to the elected Christian 
Democrat government of Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo only in early 1986. 
For El Salvador, calculated diplomatic subterfuge made less sense, 
since it faced a ferocious guerrilla war, marked by aid and advice flowing 
directly from Nicaragua to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation 
Front (FMLN). El Salvador depended upon U.S. military and economic 
support for its very survival. Its Christian Democrat regime, headed by 
José Napoléon Duarte, was elected in 1984 in a process boycotted by the 
left. 
Quiescent Honduras cast a wary eye over all of the revolutions of 
the Isthmus, sharing, as it does, a common border with Guatemala, El 
Salvador and Nicaragua. Its civilian government was really 
"bicephalous," because the armed forces commander had as much or 
more to say about policy than the President. Like El Salvador, Honduras 
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was dependent upon the United States for economic and military aid, 
and its territory served as a locale for repeated military maneuvers spon-
sored by its benefactor, the Reagan administration. Tensions with 
Nicaragua were heightened by the presence of the main contra force, the 
National Democratic Front (FDN), and its Miskito Indian component, 
Kisan, on Honduran soil—irregular armies, financed by the U.S. and at-
tempting to overthrow the Sandinista government. In elections of 
January 1986, the ineffectual Roberto Suazo Cordoba government was 
replaced by an even weaker one, led by José Azcona Hoyo of a different 
faction of the badly-divided traditional Liberal Party. 
Costa Rica, lacking an army and enjoying political stability since 
1948, also had reason to fear Nicaragua's revolutionary fervor and 
potential aggressiveness. As the nation in the region with the longest con-
sistent commitment to democratic practice, Costa Rica risked a great 
deal by allowing the U.S. and the contras (initially, the Democratic 
Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), later the FDN) to operate from its nor-
thern border. As the first state of the Isthmus to declare bankruptcy, it 
too was dependent upon American economic aid and by 1985, was 
receiving military assistance for its ill-equipped civil defence force. Costa 
Rica's traditional pro-American attitude and foreign policy was reinforc-
ed by the threat immediately to the north. 
Nicaragua had after 1979 a militant, leftist, revolutionary regime 
closely aligned with Cuba and sympathetic to the Cuban doctrine of 
"proletarian internationalism." Its support for the left in neighboring 
countries, as well as its revolutionary example, was a threat to the more 
traditional governments of the Isthmus. Once the U.S. began a process 
of eliminating economic ties with Nicaragua, the FSLN regime expanded 
links with Western Europe and the Communist states. Its burgeoning 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) ties made the 
revolutionary government appear an even greater threat. By 1984 
Nicaragua's dependence upon the COMECON states was quite advanced 
and the Reagan administration, though restrained by the Congress, 
seemed determined to remove the regime through support for the con-
tras, if not by actual U.S. invasion (expected almost daily by the FSLN). 
Nicaragua became the most heavily armed state in the region, receiving 
the latest sophisticated Soviet bloc weapons with the expection of MiGs, 
which the U.S. had made clear it would not tolerate. Guerrillas and 
young militants from neighboring states (including Honduras and Costa 
Rica) were receiving training under FSLN auspices. Any effort to diffuse 
potential threats in Central America, therefore, required a major cam-
paign by a bloc of key countries, and hopes for success did not seem 
bright. 
REGIONAL INTERESTS 
The nations that attempted to find such a solution had good reason 
to make the effort. Mexico had traditionally displayed an interest in Cen-
tral America, having exercised a profound cultural influence in the 
region, and on more than one occasion, working unsuccessfully to pre-
vent the U.S. from unseating a government that had shown a marked 
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tendency to independence. Mexico harbored the suspicion that the 
United States sought to "encircle" it and deny Mexican influence in the 
region. Moreover, a U.S. policy that aspired to eradicate the left in Cen-
tral America, created problems at home for the Mexican government 
with its own left. Since the days of Lâzaro Cardenas (1934-40) Mexico's 
foreign policy had functioned to co-opt the left domestically by display-
ing a marked tolerance of leftist regimes abroad. 
Venezuela, on the other hand, supported democracy in Latin 
America generally and the COPEI party had an affinity for the Christian 
Democrats of the region. Venezuela was also concerned about the spread 
of Cuban influence in the Caribbean basin and had pursued an activist 
policy in the Isthmus, especially during the revolutionary war against the 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle regime in Nicaragua when it had helped arm 
the Sandinistas and defend Costa Rica against threats from Somoza. 
Now it was concerned about anti-democratic tendencies in Managua, as 
well as U.S. intervention in the region. 
Colombia, the other major participant in Contadora, was also a for-
mal democracy with some seniority as such. Though conservatively 
governed it had just entered the non-aligned movement. It too sought to 
forestall both U.S. and Cuban influence in the region and no doubt wish-
ed to prevent Venezuela from gaining too much influence to the exclu-
sion of Colombia. 
Panama became involved in Contadora for two reasons. First, such 
involvement allowed Panama to demonstrate its independence from the 
U.S. However, under the populist Omar Torrijos regime, Panama had 
played a major role in the defeat of Somoza, having provided arms to the 
FSLN. Therefore it is likely that Panama's concern over the ideological 
drift in Managua provided the second reason. This was especially true 
for its coup-prone National Guard (soon to be 'promoted' to the status 
of Panamanian Defense Forces). Panama served as the seat of the Group 
but was less active than the larger states, at least until 1986. It did not en-
joy the benefits of thoroughgoing democracy, since its officer corps, 
under General Manuel Antonio Noriega, a man deeply involved in drug 
smuggling and corruption, displayed a marked instinct for political med-
dling with the executive, whom it regularly altered. Current president, 
Erick Arturo Delvalle, is referred to as 'your turn' by the local press. 
THE ORIGINS OF CONTADORA 
The origins of the Contadora process may be traced to a series of 
challenges and responses by regional actors in 1982. On March 23, for 
example, Honduran foreign minister Edgardo Paz Bârnica proposed a 
six-point agenda concerning disarmament in Central America2 in a 
speech before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American 
States. In terms similar to those adopted by Contadora the following 
year, he called for reductions in foreign military advisors, procedures 
and mechanisms to halt the regional arms traffic, respect for national 
boundaries, a permanent multilateral dialogue leading to internal 
political reconciliation, the full exercise of civil rights throughout the 
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region, and monitoring and control of compliance with compromises 
assumed by regional governments. The first serious signs of Venezuelan 
and Mexican activity aimed at promoting Central American peace was 
contained in their joint Declaration communicated to President Reagan 
on September 7, 1982. In it they recommended a regional Program of 
Cooperation, a program which resulted from a summit held in San José, 
Costa Rica on May 8.3 The Lopez Portillo-Herrera Campins initiative of 
September 7 assigned part of the blame for regional tensions to 
Nicaragua whose "disproportionate" military build-up was said to be 
responsible for poor relations with her northern neighbor, Honduras. 
Nicaragua, of course, took issue with that interpretation in its response 
to the initiative on September 24. The Sandinistas called for the start of a 
"constructive dialogue" with representatives of the Honduran govern-
ment.4 Reacting to the formation of a Latin American bloc interested in 
Central American questions, on October 4 the United States fostered a 
second Declaration of San José, backed by a 'Forum for Peace and 
Democracy,' a cluster of Central American and Caribbean states. Mex-
ico and Venezuela refused to attend but Colombia, Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica and Belize heeded the U.S. call.5 When 
approached by Costa Rica, Nicaragua rejected the San José initiative, 
citing U.S. participation. As illustrated, a flurry of activity preceded the 
launching of the Contadora Process, and from the outset, the United 
States was clearly in disagreement over Central American security issues 
with several of the participants. 
The initial meeting of the Contadora Group, on January 8-9, 1983, 
produced a consensus among the participating nations that they could 
play a constructive role in bringing peace to the Isthmus.6 Shuttle 
diplomacy commenced as the "Contadora Four," Mexico, Venezuela, 
Colombia and Panama, sought to persuade Nicaragua, El Salvador, 
Honduras and Costa Rica to cooperate in an effort to reduce tensions 
and find peaceful, negotiated solutions to their differences. The resulting 
"Bulletin" enunciated the participants concern over foreign intervention 
—direct and indirect—in Central American affairs, as well as their rejec-
tion of the East-West framework of analysis applied by the Reagan ad-
ministration. Since the United States was not, officially at least, a party 
to the process, there was considerable uncertainty concerning the U.S. 
position regarding the effort. Publicly, the American government pro-
fessed support for Contadora while its regional oponents contended that 
the 'colossus of the north' was seeking to sabotage negotiations. 
The initial emphasis was placed upon reducing tensions in the region 
and especially on preventing the outbreak of war between Honduras and 
Nicaragua, a development which could have replaced covert conflict with 
overt war across national boundaries. With this in mind a series of 
meetings were held, February to July 1983, between Contadora members 
and the key Central American states. Nothing of significance resulted, 
however. 
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THE PROCESS GAINS MOMENTUM (1983-84) 
An event of much greater importance took place on July 16-17: the 
presidents of the Contadora Four met in Mexico and issued the Cancûn 
Declaration on Peace in Central America. The document set forth, for 
the first time, a set of ten commitments which, if assumed by the states of 
the Isthmus, in the opinion of the Contadora governments, would allow 
peaceful coexistence in Central America.7 The commitments included en-
ding all belligerencies, freezing offensive weapons at their current level, 
beginning negotiations to control and reduce current weapons stocks, 
prohibiting foreign military installations within national territories, pro-
viding prior notice of important troop movements near frontiers, 
organizing groups of frontier observers, establishing mixed border 
security commissions, creating additional commissions to prevent the 
transit of weapons from one country to another, promoting a climate of 
detente and confidence in the region, and establishing direct communica-
tions between governments. For the first time, the process seemed 
hopeful, as Nicaragua welcomed the step on July 19,' the U.S. recogniz-
ed the Cancûn initiative on July 21, and Cuba spoke favorably of it on 
July 23. These steps were followed by statements of support for the pro-
cess from many nations both inside and outside the region; Honduras, El 
Salvador, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Spain, Japan, Italy, and 
India all declared their support. The Nicaraguan response came at the IV 
Anniversary celebration of the Sandinista Revolution on July 19. Junta 
Coordinator Daniel Ortega Saavedra pledged support for Contadora and 
the Cancûn Declaration and proposed a six-point agenda to attain 
regional peace. Among the points presented by Ortega were his govern-
ment's willingness to accept all proposals put forward thus far by Con-
tadora, the need for the signing of a set of regional "common 
principles," and the creation of monitoring commissions. On August 5, 
the Honduran foreign minister added his voice of approval concerning 
the results achieved at Cancûn.» 
Buoyed by this response the foreign ministers of the Contadora 
group and the five Central American states met in Panama City on 
September 7-9, and adopted a pronouncement of fundamental impor-
tance: the Document of Objectives, based upon the earlier ten-point 
agreement.10 Addressing the most serious problems of the region, the 
new Document contained 21 basic points aimed at achieving peace, 
security, the cooperation required for economic and social development, 
and the strengthening of democratic institutions in Central America. The 
Document of Objectives constituted the only specific political understan-
ding to be endorsed by the five Central American nations under the 
auspices of the Contadora Group. By adopting the Document, the Cen-
tral American states committed themselved to: end the arms race; ban 
the presence of foreign forces, or installations of national territory; 
reduce the numbers of (and eventually eliminate) foreign military ad-
visors; halt the arms traffic in the region; oppose the use of these ter-
ritories for military or logistical support of groups intent upon over-
throwing other governments; oppose acts of terrorism and sabotage in 
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Central America; and bring about national reconciliation within each 
country. Goals this sweeping would not be easy to implement or enforce 
in practice. 
With this progress came new support for the Contadora process. On 
September 27, Pope John Paul II praised the effort, and on October 8, 
representatives of 43 countries attending a meeting of the Liberal Inter-
national endorsed the quest for peace. On November 7, Alejandro Or-
fila, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, express-
ed OAS support for the initiative undertaken by the Contadora states in 
his annual report. Further, on November 11, the United Nations General 
Assembly issued Resolution 38/10, embracing both the Cancün Declara-
tion and the Document of Objectives. Finally, the General Commission 
of the XIII OAS Assembly acclaimed a Resolution reaffirming the prin-
ciples of the OAS Charter. On November 17 the Commission issued this 
Resolution and expressed its firm support for the endeavors of the Con-
tadora Group. 
Yet the response that counted, of course, was the one from 
Managua. On September 26, Coordinator Ortega endorsed the Docu-
ment of Objectives and reiterated Nicaragua's support for the peace pro-
cess." On October 15, the Nicaraguan government drew up an official 
proposal, intended for consideration within the Contadora framework, 
entitled "Juridical Bases to Guarantee International Peace and Security 
in the Central American States."12 This served to shape, to a con-
siderable degree, the subsequent efforts of the Contadora Group. The 
proposal contained four draft treaties: the first, a guarantee of mutual 
respect, peace and security between Nicaragua and the United States; the 
second, a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation between Honduras 
and Nicaragua; the third, an accord intended to contribute to the 
peaceful solution of the armed conflict in El Salvador; and the fourth, a 
general treaty for the maintenance of peace and security as well as friend-
ship and cooperation between the states of Central America. The United 
States opposed this effort by Nicaragua to redirect the Contadora Pro-
cess to Nicaragua's advantage.13 
In addition, no other Central American state acted upon the 
Nicaraguan initiative. As a result, the Sandinista effort was aborted. The 
failure of other Central American states to act lends credence to the 
Nicaraguan charge that the Tegucigalpa bloc is dependent upon the U.S. 
for its policy direction. 
Nonetheless, the process made concrete progress early in 1984 when 
the foreign ministers of the Contadora Four and of Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua met in Panama City. 
The joint meeting drew up an appropriately named document, "Norms 
for the Implementation of Commitments in the Document of 
Objectives,"14 treating questions of regional security, political systems, 
and cooperation in economic and social matters. Separate Commissions 
on Security, Political Affairs, and Economic and Social Affairs soon set 
to work. In April the Central American and Contadora foreign 
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ministers, acting upon reports submitted by the Commissions, agreed to 
carry on the task of ordering and integrating available information, 
facilitating the preparation of documents which could become regional 
peace agreements. 
By June 9, the Contadora Group was ready to submit its first com-
prehensive draft agreement for consideration by the Heads of State of 
the five Central American nations." Entitled "Contadora Act for Peace 
and Cooperation in Central America," it represented an effort to incor-
porate all of the proposals that had emerged up to mid-1984." It stressed 
the need for detente in Central America and the importance of 
confidence-building measures but more importantly, it set down rules for 
the conduct of military maneuvers, banned new foreign military bases or 
training establishments and proposed the elimination of existing bases 
within one year of the treaty's signing. The draft affirmed the need to 
end arms sales and the arms race in the region and to deny support for ir-
regular forces and proposed the creation of a mechanism for control and 
verification through a permanent and autonomous commission. The Act 
envisioned the creation of rapid communication channels between 
governments and military authorities and the foundation of mixed 
security commissions, particularly between Nicaragua and Honduras 
while strengthening existing ones such as the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan 
commission. The Act also advocated the principles of pluralist 
democracy with full freedom for different currents of opinion, national 
reconciliation and dialogue, including certain guarantees for opponents 
and amnesties. A political commission was envisioned, of a construction 
similar to the military commission, to receive and assess information 
about the implementation of political, electoral, and human rights 
obligations undertaken by the signatories." In July, U.S. special envoy 
Harry Schlaudemann and Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Victor Hugo Tinoco began bilateral talks at Manzanillo, Mexico. Each 
of these moves seemed to portend progress in resolving various conflicts 
in the Isthmus. 
The revised version of the Contadora Act for Peace and Coopera-
tion in Central America was submitted to the five Central American 
states on September 7, 1984." Two weeks of intensive study followed, 
during which neither the United States nor its Isthmian allies publicly 
criticized the document. Then on September 21, to the astonishment of 
Nicaragua's adversaries, the Sandinistas agreed to accept the Act in its 
entirety, immediately and without modification." The U.S., caught by 
surprise, protested that the Act was a draft only, never intended to be a 
final document; changes were necessary, asserted Washington on Oc-
tober 1. The allies were unprepared for the rapid and wholly positive 
Nicaraguan response and a consultation was called among the San-
dinistas' neighbors. In the end, despite having expressed support for the 
document earlier, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and "neutral" 
Guatemala would be pressured effectively by U.S. envoy Harry 
Schlaudemann not to sign the treaty draft." Clearly, the U.S. commit-
ment to destabilize Nicaragua played a role in this decision: the North 
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Americans were counted upon to protect the Tegucigalpa bloc from the 
aggressive revolution next door. Whether more direct leverage was ap-
plied by Schlaudemann, one cannot be certain. The Act that stirred such 
concern was not in itself a weak document: it prohibited the introduction 
of new weapons systems or the construction of foreign military bases in 
the Isthmus; and it called for the eventual removal of foreign military ad-
visors, an end to "regional and extra-regional arms traffic to persons, 
organizations, irregular forces or armed bands that [were] trying to 
destabilize governments," and for free elections and an amnesty for 
political dissidents.21 In the U.S. view, however, the document offered 
decided disadvantages to open democracies and favored Nicaragua's 
"closed society" where the government would implement its tenets selec-
tively. 
FAILED OPPORTUNITY: THE PROCESS STALLS (1984-85) 
In view of the opposition, Honduran Foreign Minister Paz Bârnica 
hosted a meeting on October 20 of the Central American nations aligned 
with the U.S. to discuss new revisions of the Contadora Act. A 'counter-
draft' resulted which included several proposed changes, aimed at pro-
ducing "an appropriate equilibrium" between the demands of each of 
the Central American states.22 The counterdraft called for: 1) an im-
mediate temporary arms freeze, followed by negotiations to set each na-
tion's arms level; 2) the establishment of a verification and control com-
mission that included representatives from each of the Central American 
states and had the power to conduct on-site inspections; 3) the elimina-
tion of the original document's ban on military maneuvers; and 4) a pro-
posal for a timetable to be drawn up within ninety days for the elimina-
tion of foreign bases and removal of foreign military advisors.23 Clearly, 
this reflected U.S. concern over the weakness of enforcement provisions 
contained in the earlier revised Act. 
The U.S. government was now faced with Nicaragua's acceptance 
of the revised Act and with the pressure exerted by the Contadora states 
upon each of the Central American 'democracies' to sign a document 
which the United States considered to be contrary to its interest. In 
response, the U.S. sought to forestall Latin American acceptance by 
countering this pressure. According to a National Security Council 
memo, the Tegucigalpa counterdraft reflected the administration's 
"concerns and shift[ed] the focus within Contadora to a document 
broadly consistent with U.S. interests."24 Moreover, a secret background 
paper, prepared for the NSC on October 30, asserted that the U.S. 
government had succeeded in blocking the Contadora Group's efforts to 
impose the second draft of the revised Act.25 The memo also 
acknowledged that the counterdraft submitted to the Contadora states 
by the Tegucigalpa Group was the result of intensive U.S. consultation 
with its allies—El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. The Tegucigalpa 
response forced the Contadora states into another round of consulta-
tions and prolonged the peace effort into 1985. 
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The Contadora Group met in Panama on January 8-9, 1985 (on the 
second anniversary of the process) to discuss the objections to the revised 
act put forward at Tegucigalpa by Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa 
Rica. The Group called for a new conference to be held in February in 
Panama and to include all of the Central American republics. However, 
on January 10 Costa Rica announced its decision not to attend any fur-
ther Contadora meetings until its dispute with Nicaragua over the San-
dinistas' alleged violation of Costa Rican asylum for a Nicaraguan 
youth, José Manuel Urbina Lara, was resolved.26 In addition, Costa Rica 
petitioned the Organization of American States (OAS) to investigate the 
case. The issue escalated when, on January 17, the Honduran National 
Security Council expressed its solidarity with Costa Rica, announcing 
that unless Urbina Lara was released Honduras would also boycott the 
February meeting. The following day, the Salvadoran government, de-
nouncing Nicaragua's "totalitarian system," its "contempt for 
legality," and its "lack of respect for human rights," joined its two allies 
in boycotting the February gathering." 
This occurred just prior to an abrupt deterioration in 
U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. The Reagan administration, frustrated in its 
attempts to get the Congress to support the Contra war, considered new 
measures to bring pressure to bear upon the Sandinistas, including more 
thoroughgoing restrictions on U.S. trade and commerce with Nicaragua. 
Between January 17-19, U.S. National Security Advisor, Robert 
McFarlane, made a secret tour of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Costa Rica and Panama.28 The purpose of the trip was never revealed. 
Occurring as it did in the midst of the crisis in the Contadora process, 
McFarlane's intent may have been to reassure regional allies that the 
Reagan administration could be counted upon to support their position 
and perhaps also to inform them of an impending breakdown in talks 
with the Sandinista government. Following McFarlane's return to 
Washington, the U.S. announced the suspension of its discussions with 
the Nicaraguan government—discussions which had begun in July 1984 
at Manzanillo, Mexico, and proceeded through nine apparently fruitless 
sessions. Both the Sandinistas and the Contadora Group were (and still 
are) greatly distressed by this development, which seemed to close the 
door on a peaceful solution in the Isthmus. Nicaragua had used the Man-
zanillo talks to consider issues bilaterally which it had agreed to treat 
comprehensively in the Contadora process.2' By ending discussions, the 
U.S. was, in part, attempting to force the Sandinistas to deal with these 
matters in a multilateral regional forum. 
The Contadora meeting scheduled for February 12-14, 1985 was 
cancelled.30 Subsequent moves would await resolution of the asylum con-
flict which was resolved through mediation by the Contadora Four in 
March.31 A new meeting to include the Contadora Group and the Central 
American states could now be scheduled for May 14-16 in Panama. 
During this work session agreements were produced on implementa-
tion procedures pertaining to illegal arms traffic, the withdrawal of 'ir-
regular forces' from the region, and the establishment of a direct 
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communication system to handle potentially volatile regional incidents. 
Nothing was achieved, however, regarding verification and arms control, 
issues that proved to be intractable." At the conclusion of the May 
meeting the Contadora Group governments circulated a proposal to 
resolve the more difficult security issues, which were to be considered at 
the next meeting in June.33 
The Contadora Group met with the Central American Ministers of 
Foreign Relations on June 18-19. By then, a new issue had arisen to trou-
ble the Nicaraguans. Following the U.S. House of Representatives seem-
ingly definitive vote against financial aid to the Contras, Ortega had 
departed on a tour of the Communist Party States, in quest of financial 
aid. U.S. congressmen who had taken a political risk by supporting a 
'diplomatic solution' then reversed themselves and $27 million in 
'humanitarian aid' was provided for the contras. The Nicaraguan 
government, as a result, sought to alter the agenda of the Contadora 
meeting to include the contra aid issue as well as discussion of border 
conflicts with Costa Rica. The alliance of Nicaragua's neighbors, Hon-
duras, El Salvador and Costa Rica, objected, insisting that only topics 
related to the regional Peace Act should be discussed. In consequence, 
the conference had to be suspended.34 Once again, the process was in 
disarray. 
On July 21-22, 1985, two-and-a-half years after the initiation of the 
peace effort, the foreign ministers of the Contadora Four met on the 
island where it had all begun to evaluate their frustrated labors. More im-
portantly, they met to plan tactics for the immediate future and the 
results were fruitful. It was decided that the Contadora vice-foreign 
ministers should visit each Central American country to determine the 
criteria for resolving unsettled issues. It was also resolved that Contadora 
membership be restricted to those now belonging. Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua were urged to begin a dialogue, in August, to work out their 
border-related problems bilaterally, and the U.S. and Nicaragua were en-
couraged to renew the suspended ManzaniUo talks. Finally the theme of 
Central American pacification was proposed as an agenda item for the 
October General Assembly of the United Nations.35 
Contadora received an important vote of confidence in Latin 
America on July 28 when representatives from throughout the region 
gathered for the inauguration of the youthful President of Peru, Alan 
Garcia. The suggestion that a support group of additional major Latin 
American states be organized became a reality with the "Lima Declara-
tion," issued by Peru, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Beyond offering 
support for the Contadora process, the Declaration embraced 
cooperative postures on the debt, arms limitations, and called for a 
regional presidential summit.36 
Now backed by all major regional powers (except Chile), the vice-
foreign ministers of the Contadora Group set out on a four-day tour of 
Central America in August 1985. On the tour they attempted to deter-
mine the criteria for each country to resolve all remaining unsettled 
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security issues blocking the signing of a regional peace agreement. Matters 
still perplexing participants included issues such as arms control, limits on 
the size of armed forces, and the numbers of foreign military advisors." 
The departure of the Contadora vice-foreign ministers was preceded by 
a meeting of the so-called Central American bloc countries, or Tegucigalpa 
Group, "to evaluate the negotiating process of the five countries of the 
region" and to draw up a new peace strategy to be presented to Contadora 
at the end of August. In that meeting, Costa Rica urged a partial implemen-
tation of the unsigned Peace Act, accomplished by undertaking a series of 
tasks. A study would be made to determine the constitutional implications 
of those parts of the Act that could become effective on a provisional basis. 
All arms and military personnel would be inventoried with maximums sug-
gested that could be negotiated later. The countries that formed the verifica-
tion and control teams would be selected, costs projected and sources of 
funds and funding mechanisms identified. The human and material in-
frastructure required to implement the Act, once it was signed, also had to 
be prepared. A permanent committee of plenipotentiaries, to meet at length 
and facilitate the signing, needed to be created.38 In this effort, Costa Rica's 
role had become quite positive, as the region's most democratic nation 
gradually, yet hesitantly, moved toward a degree of reconciliation with San-
dinista Nicaragua. 
The Contadora Group met with representatives from Argentina, 
Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay in Cartagena, Colombia, on August 24-25, to 
formalize the existence of the Lima Group. During the meeting several roles 
were assigned to the new participants. They were to exchange information 
with the Contadora Four concerning Central American problems and iden-
tify any new measures that might lead to a solution, make diplomatic con-
tracts with governments having interests in the region, with those simply 
moved to promote peace in Central America, and with international 
organizations such as the UN or the OAS, work toward the swift signing of 
a peace agreement, and, once signed, promote effective compliance with 
such an agreement. In short, they were to lend their considerable weight to 
the effort in every possible manner." 
The Tegucigalpa Group—the opponents of Nicaragua—met in San 
José, Costa Rica on September 3-4 to finalize their joint position for the up-
coming Contadora meeting. The foreign ministers of El Salvador, Hon-
duras, and Costa Rica, and the vice minister from Guatemala who sat as an 
observer, prepared a joint communiqué denouncing the lack of dialogue 
between the Nicaraguan government and the diverse political and armed op-
position groups, insisting upon negotiations that should lead quickly to 
"justice and representative democracy." The foreign ministers also demand-
ed that Contadora be "more energetic" with Nicaragua.40 The position of 
the Tegucigalpa Group was very close to that of the U.S. With the Con-
tadora meeting approaching, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs Elliott Abrams summoned his principal diplomats to a 
meeting in Panama on September 9-10 to discuss the need to counteract 
perceived Latin American solidarity with Nicaragua and to prevent Con-
tadora from producing an agreement that did not fully respond to U.S. in-
terests.41 
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The key Contadora meeting in which the final version of the Act was 
to be presented took place on September 12-13 at Panama City. While 
this meeting was underway, the U.S. roving Ambassador for Central 
America, Mr. Schlaudemann, visited the four countries of the Con-
tadora Support Group to clarify U.S. objections to the revised docu-
ment. The Contadora Group ministers delivered the revised Act for 
Peace and Cooperation to their Central American colleagues.42 The 
document represented a revision of the September 7, 1984 version, hav-
ing incorporated the observations of the Tegucigalpa Group.43 At the 
time, Mexican Foreign Secretary Bernardo Sepulveda commented that 
only "polishing and tuning" had been done to the original peace Act, to 
which Nicaraguan foreign minister Miguel d'Escoto replied, "There are 
changes that I cannot consider polishing."44 The revised Act called for, 
among other things, the removal of all foreign military bases and ad-
visors, the regulation (not the halting) of military maneuvers with foreign 
participation, an end to the Central American arms race, the use of 
negotiated settlements in both external and internal conflicts (though the 
previous drafts had dealt fundamentally with external conflicts), the 
regulation (not the end) of the use of one state's territory to destabilize 
another state, the proscription of arms trafficking, and the encourage-
ment of democracy as the preferred political system. An additional pro-
tocol was also included to draw in extraregional nations with an interest 
in the area, to insure their respect and support for the Act—this was in-
tended for the signatures of the Contadora nations and the United 
States, if not others.45 
Contadora was to enter into 'permanent session' on October 7, for 
the purpose of producing a final revision of the Act as soon as possible. 
Given the composition of the Contadora bloc, there could be no 
guarantee that the U.S. position would be instrumental in the creation of 
the final document. In anticipation of the push for completion, Secretary 
of State George Shultz met with the foreign ministers of Guatemala and 
the Tegucigalpa Group in Washington on October 2 in order to present 
the positions and preoccupations of the Reagan administration in ad-
vance. Shultz emphasized the importance of "internal reconciliation" in 
Nicaragua and contended that the United States would be under no 
obligation as a result of a signing of the Contadora Act. Shortly 
thereafter, the Tegucigalpa bloc called upon Ecuador and the Dominican 
Republic, both U.S. allies, to join the Lima Group. The move was widely 
seen as an effort to dilute the Contadora process, although it was clearly 
aimed at bringing the support bloc into closer harmony with the position 
of Nicaragua's neighbors and the U.S.46 Neither of these states joined. 
So concerned was the United States over the possibility that an 'in-
adequate' document might be signed, that a delegation of the U.S. Na-
tional Security Council embarked upon a "secret mission" to Central 
America, prior to the October 7 "permanent" meeting of Vice-
Ministers. The NSC's goal was apparently to persuade friendly govern-
ments to withhold support for the Contadora Act in its present form.47 
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The crucial "permanent" session began on October 7 on the Island 
of Contadora. Its aim was to reach agreement on a final Central 
American Peace Accord within a period not to exceed 45 days with the 
Contadora Group setting November 22 as its self-imposed deadline. 
Three rounds of talks were to be held, the first October 7-11, the second 
October 17-19, and the third November 6-9. Strong U.S. pressure con-
tinued during the sessions, so much so that the Panamanian Head of In-
telligence, Lt. Colonel Julio Ow Young, complained that the United 
States was involved in a "seditious plan" to align Panama in a "regional 
operation designed to neutralize and destroy the Contadora Group," 
and that the U.S. was implementing measures "against Panamanian par-
ticipation in . . . Contadora . . .."*' Reagan administration statements 
indicated that the key to U.S. acceptance of any agreement was 'internal 
reconciliation' within Nicaragua. In a White House "Report on 
Nicaragua," released November 6, the U.S. bolstered its contention that 
the domestic and foreign policies of the FSLN were at the root of Central 
American interstate tensions and the cause of internal conflict in 
Nicaragua. The American goal was to convince the Sandinista regime to 
enter into negotiations with the new Contra organization, the "United 
National Opposition" (UNO), the major component of which was the 
armed FDN, as a condition for the resumption of U.S.-Nicaraguan 
bilateral talks. Washington's position was that without FSLN-opposition 
negotiations, Contadora could not proceed.4' 
In light of the 'defects' in the Act and the hostile U.S. posture, 
Nicaragua formally rejected the current draft treaty on October 8, calling 
for the inclusion of the United States to make the process 'realistic' In a 
lengthy letter to the Presidents of the Contadora nations, President 
Ortega expressed Nicaragua's preoccupation with the lack of a 
mechanism to involve the U.S. openly in the peace effort. In rejecting the 
September 1985 draft treaty, Nicaragua called for an amendment to the 
document explicitly requiring three commitments from the United 
States: 1) to halt all forms of "aggression" against Nicaragua; 2) to com-
ply with international agreements on military maneuvers; and 3) to com-
ply with two World Court rulings, that of May 10 concerning the mining 
of Nicaraguan harbors in May 1984 by the CIA and that against the U.S. 
for supporting the contras. In addition to these concerns with regard to 
the U.S. the FSLN government cited four specific areas in which it con-
sidered the current draft treaty to be a step backward from the 1984 ver-
sion, namely sections on: 1) military maneuvers; 2) commitments on ar-
maments and troop strength; 3) foreign military advisors; and 4) the 
duration of the treaty's validity and its denunciation procedures.30 These 
were the areas which, as a result of consultation, had undergone 
modification since the earlier draft. 
THE PROCESS IN CRISIS (1985-86) 
As a result of the U.S. and Nicaraguan campaigns against the draft 
treaty the Contadora effort now entered into a new period of crisis. On 
December 7, 1985, in response to a request by Nicaragua, the Contadora 
Group's mediation effort suffered a postponement for a five-month 
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period, not necessarily in the interest of the U.S. government. In the 
FSLN regime's view, the upcoming changes in the presidencies of three 
Central American states—Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica—war-
ranted the temporary halt in Contadora's efforts." Such a halt was 
justified when Guatemalan President-elect Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo, on a 
tour of regional capitals in mid-December, proposed the creation of a 
Central American parliament to provide a forum, free of foreign in-
fluence, in which regional problems could be discussed.32 It appeared 
that the new regimes were going to back away, to a degree as yet undefin-
ed, from compliance with U.S. policy prescriptions for the region. 
As a result of this postponement, the foreign ministers of the Con-
tadora Group and the Lima Group met in Caraballeda, Venezuela on 
January 11-12, 1986 to analyze Contadora's three years of labor and to 
set in place a binding commitment to peace in Central America, in hopes 
of extrcating the region from East/West rivalry. As a consequence of this 
meeting, the "Caraballeda Message for Peace, Security and Democracy 
in Central America" was spelled out. The joint communiqué compiled a 
list of nine priorities to be stressed in future efforts: resumption and con-
clusion of negotiations leading to the signing of the Contadora Peace 
Agreement; resumption of direct talks with Nicaragua by the U.S.; en-
couragement of an end to foreign support for irregular forces and for in-
surrectionist movements; suspension of international military 
maneuvers; gradual reduction and eventual elimination of foreign 
military advisors and of foreign military installations; a unilateral 
declaration of non-aggression by the five Central American countries; 
and steps to promote regional and international cooperation to alleviate 
pressing economic and social problems.53 
The Latin American "solidarity" that the Sandinistas detected at 
the gathering pleased them, especially as it was expressed in the "Prin-
ciples of Caraballeda," another document issued by the participants. 
The ten "Principles" included: Latin American solutions to Latin 
American problems; respect for self-determination; non-interference in 
the affairs of other states; territorial integrity, pluralist democracy; the 
absence of foreign armaments or military bases; prohibition of military 
acts against neighbors; banning of foreign troops or advisors; no 
political, logistic, or military support to subversive groups; and respect 
for human rights. Delegates at the Caraballeda meeting also supported 
the proposal by Vinicio Cerezo to establish a Central American parlia-
ment.54 
The inauguration of Cerezo as President of Guatemala provided an 
opportunity for a mid-January gathering of regional heads of state in 
Guatemala City. Following the ceremonies, the Presidents issued the 
Guatemalan Declaration which reaffirmed their confidence in the 
possibilities and benefits of dialogue and their vigorous support for Con-
tadora.55 In addition, they agreed to convoke a regional summit in the 
spring, at Esquipulas, Guatemala, to consider forming a Central 
American legislature. Once again, they backed a proposal calling on the 
U.S. to resume direct negotiations with Managua.56 
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REVITALIZING THE PROCESS (1986) 
The United States was still committed to the idea that pressure 
resulting from the contra war was necessary to bring the FSLN regime to 
the bargaining table in a sufficiently compliant frame of mind. On 
January 18, Assistant Secretary of State Abrams asserted that it was a 
mistake to think that contra activity undercut the peace initiative. He 
claimed that the only way to get the Sandinistas to accept Contadora 
was, in fact, to apply more pressure.57 The added pressure was to come 
from a Reagan administration request in February for an additional $100 
million in aid to the contras. The U.S. response to the Caraballeda 
Message was delivered to the states of the region in late January when 
Special Envoy to Central America Schlaudemann travelled twice to Cen-
tral America, Colombia, and Venezuela to discuss its implications. 
Nicaragua was omitted from his itinerary." Publicly, the United States 
claimed to support Caraballeda and the administration soon lobbied 
Congress anew in quest of support for a major contra aid package. 
In view of U.S. determination to exert pressure on Managua by sup-
port for the contras, the foreign ministers of both the Contadora and 
Lima Groups converged on Washington in February to urge Secretary of 
State Shultz to halt aid to the contras and return to the negotiating table 
by resuming the Manzanillo talks. The Latin American effort proved a 
failure, however, when Secretary Shultz and President Reagan persisted 
in urging Congress to provide $100 million in military and 
'humanitarian' aid to the contras." However, by the spring of 1986, 
several developments indicated that the U.S. posture needed to be soften-
ed in light of trends in the region. First, the Liberacion Party and 
President-elect Oscar Arias of Costa Rica had prevailed upon his 
predecessor, President Luis Alberto Monge, who had previously been 
very much in the U.S. camp, to commence talks with the Sandinistas 
aimed at providing a system of joint border surveillance and a commen-
surate reduction of tensions between the two states. The Contadora 
Group entered the process as mediator and concrete steps were taken by 
both sides, resulting in a warming trend in relations between the two 
neighbors. Second, in the aftermath of an incursion into Honduras by 
Nicaraguan forces (which Washington sought to utilize in order to 
bolster the chances for a favorable vote in Congress on contra aid), it was 
revealed that secret contacts had been in effect for some time between 
these belligerent states. Thus, Honduras was, in fact, informed in ad-
vance when Sandinista troops entered Honduran territory to attack con-
tra bases. Contadora pressure was now applied to effect a solution in the 
north similar to the one underway on Nicaragua's southern border. The 
new President of Honduras, Azcona, seemed more anxious (as did the 
Honduran Armed Forces as well) than his predecessor to reduce tensions 
with Nicaragua. The Honduran administration was still inclined to take 
its directions from Washington, however, and this was more evident by 
mid-1986.60 
Nonetheless, in light of these trends, it appeared that the U.S. would 
have to soften its stand. The new approach may have been signalled on 
20 
Conflict Quarterly 
March 7 when President Reagan, asserting that the United States was 
seeking a "diplomatic solution for Central America," announced the ap-
pointment of Philip Habib as Special Envoy to the region. According to 
some administration officials, however, Habib's mission was designed, 
in part, to sway sceptical members of Congress to the president's side on 
the contra aid issue.61 
New administration pronouncements, and developments in Central 
America following Habib's visits, soon made it appear that a change was 
in the offing. Quite unexpectedly, on April 11, Habib wrote to key op-
position members of Congress spelling out a compromise whereby U.S. 
support for the contras would cease in exchange for peaceful behavior by 
the Sandinistas and adherence to the strict terms of the Contadora Peace 
Act.62 Yet, it is evident that Habib did not speak for all factions in the 
Administration.63 
On April 12, Nicaragua suddenly altered the posture announced by 
foreign minister d'Escoto at Caraballeda and agreed to sign the revised 
Contadora Act, on the condition that the United States halt its aid to the 
contras.64 On April 16, in a letter from Habib to Panamanian foreign 
minister Jorge Abadia Arias (Panama functioned as secretary to the 
Contadora Group), the Reagan administration did indeed offer to halt 
the renewal of military aid to the contras if Nicaragua signed the Con-
tadora peace pact on June 6, 1986, as urged by the Contadora Group.65 
The offer was conditional upon a U.S. desire to continue "humanitarian 
aid to those irregular forces so they do not lack necessities and can be 
repatriated if that is the case." The foreign minister said such aid "would 
logically be distributed under the supervision of Contadora." (Habib's 
offer to halt contra aid if Nicaragua "signed" evidently misrepresented 
administration policy. The more accurate phrase would have been "com-
plies with treaty terms.") Abadia Arias had also received a letter from 
the Nicaraguan government stating its willingness to sign on June 6 and 
asserting that it was "ready to renew negotiations about the two points in 
question—armaments and military advisors." The Sandinista stance 
seemed less hopeful on May 8, when Victor Hugo Tinoco said that 
Nicaragua "demand[ed] a formal and simultaneous guarantee of non-
aggression from Washington on the day that Nicaragua sign[ed] the Con-
tadora Peace Act." Further, on May 16, Nicaragua's ambassador to 
Peru rejected the claim by the Panamanian Foreign Minister that the 
Sandinistas had agreed to sign the Peace Act.66 By mid-May the political 
'right' in Washington was counter-attacking also, attempting to under-
mine Habib and move the administration back toward unconditional 
support for the contras. As Habib was communicating his positive 
message to Abadia Arias, Secretary Shultz, in a letter to Democrat Dante 
Fascell, was denying that the administration was ready to settle dif-
ferences with Nicaragua; the U.S. would only stop aiding the contras 
when the Sandinistas entered into negotiations with their domestic op-
ponents.67 The administration was still determined to force the San-
dinistas to talk to their domestic opponents, in keeping with a key pro-
position contained in Contadora's original 21 points. 
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The atmosphere was cooling by May 1986, and the Nicaraguan 
regime, with the Sandinistas believing U.S. "aggressions" would con-
tinue, now seemed disinclined to sign the revised Act. Ortega insisted on 
two prerequisites before signing: the Central American states must reach 
an agreement on pending issues and U.S. "aggression" must cease.6' In 
the United States the debate continued with 'hawks' in the Pentagon and 
State Department, led by Fred Ikle, sponsoring a report, released in mid-
May, which argued that Nicaragua would violate the agreement, thereby 
weakemng the security of Honduras and Costa Rica and provoking a 
U.S. military intervention within three years." When administration 
spokespersons denied that the report represented policy, differences in 
Washington were exposed for the world to see. Then, on May 22, in 
response to an attack by Congressman Jack Kemp and conservative 
Republicans on the new conciliatory policy line, the administration reaf-
firmed its support for both Habib and a comprehensive enforceable trea-
ty. 
As a result of divided counsels in Managua and the U.S., the June 6 
signing was by no means assured, though for the Nicaraguans, by late 
May, expediency seemed to encourage such an act, particularly since 
signing might place Washington in an extremely awkward position.70 In 
an attempt to resolve outstanding issues, Central American deputy 
foreign ministers began two days of talks with their Contadora counter-
parts on May 17 in Panama City. On the agenda were the two difficult 
points still pending in the Peace Act: arms control and reduction, and 
foreign military maneuvers in Central America. Tinoco, the Sandinista 
representative, proposed that each country's security needs be considered 
separately and he expressed alarm that there were currently "three dif-
ferent [military] exercises" sponsored by the U.S. occurring 
simultaneously in Honduras.71 A new development at this meeting was 
the posture of Guatemala: it was allied for the first time, with the 
"Tegucigalpa bloc" against Nicaragua. As a result the Sandinistas left 
Panama City more isolated than they had been for several years.72 Such 
isolation was not likely to encourage the United States to be more flexi-
ble. 
As the U.S. public position came to include the requirement of ac-
tual compliance with any Contadora treaty before aid to the contras end-
ed, it soon became apparent that the date of signing would be postponed 
once again. The question remained verification—a major issue in the 
view of the United States—and the cost and scope of any policing 
mechanism. The Department of State estimated that it would cost $40 
million annually and would require 1,300 permanent observers to ensure 
compliance with any Central American peace treaty.73 The meeting of 
the Presidents of Central American states at Esquipulas, Guatemala in 
late May revealed that any signing on June 6 would have to be postponed 
in favor of further negotiations on the remaining issues.74 The declara-
tion emerging from the meeting had to be modified when, at the in-
sistence of Costa Rica, Nicaragua's neighbors proved unwilling to accept 
Ortega's election as "democratic,"75 though one positive result was the 
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acceptance of President Cerezo's suggestion that a Central American 
Parliament be formed. 
On the day following the summit, President Ortega released a docu-
ment promising to sign the Peace Act if U.S. allies in the region were 
willing to discuss banning military maneuvers with foreign forces, bases 
and advisors. Moreover, the Nicaraguans had produced a list of 'offen-
sive' weaponry they were now willing to limit or abolish, including 
military airports, planes and helicopters, warships, tanks, heavy mor-
tars, artillery of at least 160 mm, and multiple rocket launchers. The San-
dinistas also proposed that the purchase of offensive weapons be 
suspended for 180 days, following the treaty's signing, in order to inven-
tory weapons supplies and that a limit on offensive weapons should be 
negotiated within 60 days as well.76 This represented a reversal of 
Nicaragua's April position when Managua had refused to approve an 
arms freeze. Honduras, joined by El Salvador, Costa Rica and 
Guatemala, characterized these suggestions as unacceptable. Costa Rica 
and Guatemala then proposed that joint military exercises be permitted 
ten kilometers from the border, with a limit of 60 days per year and no 
more than 5,000 troops participating. El Salvador and Honduras endors-
ed this proposal but it, in turn, was rejected by Nicaragua." Guatemala 
proposed an alternative to the Nicaraguan plan: to freeze the present na-
tional arsenals, with application of a weighted point system to evaluate 
weaponry. The alliance of Guatemala with the Tegucigalpa bloc once 
again isolated the Sandinistas. As a consequence, it seems likely they will 
be forced to make additional concessions in the future, if they are to 
come to terms with their neighbors. 
The Contadora Group began a new round of talks on May 27 at 
Panama City, in an attempt to arrive at agreements that could resolve 
differences over military-related issues. Contadora foreign ministers ar-
rived on June 6, even though the signing had been postponed, "to 
evaluate the state of the negotiations," in the words of the Guatemalan 
vice-minister.78 Foreign ministers of the South American Support Group 
arrived as well, adding weight to the moment. Contadora spokespersons 
were not all optimistic, however; Colombian minister Augusto Ramirez 
Ocampo noted that "the gap may be too great between Nicaragua and its 
neighbors." The Sandinistas had proposed, for example, that the 
'military count' should include all participants in maneuvers, while, on 
the other hand, militia should not be counted in national totals. While 
the majority of her neighbors accepted this proposition, Honduras, the 
most affected, did not.7' 
Nonetheless, on June 7, the Contadora ministers handed over to the 
Central American states a third draft treaty that was rather optimistically 
termed the "last version" of the proposed regional peace accord. The 
leaders were urged to sign the pact swiftly and negotiate details concern-
ing verification later. In turn, the Contadora foreign ministers pledged to 
continue their efforts to achieve a regional peace formula; it seems that 
keeping the process alive had become an end in itself, to forestall a 
broader conflict, including direct U.S. intervention." By proposing a 
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new version of the treaty and avoiding setting a new deadline, the Con-
tadora members kept the door ajar for continuing negotiations without 
risking the appearance of a new failure. Nicaraguan minister d'Escoto 
optimistically predicted that a treaty version acceptable to all could be 
agreed upon by the end of July, but his view was evidently not to be 
shared by his colleagues, and especially by the United States, since it left 
unresolved questions of how to verify compliance." 
The 'details' which remained were not minor. The most important 
shifts in this 'third draft treaty' dealt with arms limits and military 
maneuvers. It assigned relative weight to different kinds of arms, as the 
Guatemalans suggested, but attempted to balance Sandinista concerns 
with those of her neighbors. Nicaragua had offered to limit offensive 
weapons but claimed the need to possess a larger military than other 
states of the region, due to Sandinista perception of the U.S. threat. (It 
must keep the potential cost to the U.S. high enough to prevent an inva-
sion from being contemplated.) Honduras defended its right to par-
ticipate in repeated military maneuvers with the United States, while 
Nicaragua claimed these maneuvers prepared Honduras for the role of 
'platform' for a future U.S. invasion. Washington insisted that 
simultaneous verification, in particular, of military controls and 
nonintervention, must accompany the signing of any workable Central 
American pact, and El Salvador continued to support the U.S. posture 
on this crucial matter, because of FSLN support for the Salvadoran 
FMLN. On the other hand, Costa Rica and Guatemala seemed 
somewhat more amenable. In a letter accompanying the draft treaty, the 
Contadora governments noted that "Once this question is resolved, we 
propose immediately going on to another phase of negotiation . . . prin-
cipally to the status of the commission of verification and control.""2 
The U.S. and its allies appeared to have rejected this formulation, in-
sisting on verification assurances in advance. 
THE FUTURE OF CONTADORA 
The problem is, as Mexican analyst Jorge Castaneda put it, 
"Nobody has anything to gain from an accord now.'"3 If Nicaragua had 
signed the Peace Act, the U.S. Congress would not have voted the $100 
million for the contras; but, by signing, the Sandinistas would have lost 
their 800 or so Cuban military advisors and confronted limitations on 
arms acquisition. By signing, El Salvador would lose its 54 U.S. military 
advisors and face arms limits as well. Honduras would lose its 200 or so 
U.S. advisors and possibly the joint maneuvers which, in the view of 
some military officials, keep the Nicaraguans at bay. Costa Rica fears 
the Sandinistas also and is hesitant to see Nicaragua 'legitimized' under 
its current political system. The United States, in particular, shares the 
concerns of Costa Rica and Honduras regarding the Nicaraguan 'threat' 
and cannot accept the removal of its military advisors and the limitations 
placed upon its military aid programs unless the Nicaraguan government 
itself takes on a pluralist cast, which might signal the abandonment of 
Cuban-style 'proletarian internationalism.' The Sandinista assessment 
may be correct: barring direct negotiations between Nicaragua and the 
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United States, no peace accord may be workable. The continuation of 
the Contadora Process is in the interest of Nicaragua, then, since it keeps 
the regime in touch with Latin American 'solidarity' and helps to keep 
the U.S. from isolating the revolutionary government.'4 
Despite the distance that still separates the two sides, these 
developments, taken together, demonstrate that Contadora was still a 
viable but powerless mediator in mid-1986, with all actors relying upon 
its good offices. Progress, though gradual, was evident in the refining of 
the issues. The broad questions that remained were: 1) whether the San-
dinistas on the one hand, and the U.S. and its regional allies on the other, 
would accept the outcome of negotiations over troops levels and 
maneuvers; and 2) whether the Sandinistas would cease to represent a 
threat to neighboring states and whether the Reagan administration 
would back away from its determined effort to change the Nicaraguan 
government, ending military aid for the contras. This presumes, of 
course, that the Sandinistas might still be interested in Contadora when 
freed from Contra pressure. If these two difficult problems could be 
resolved, Contadora might yet see its efforts reach fruition. For that to 
occur, the Peace Pact itself must be seen by all affected parties as serving 
their interests. Such was still not the case by mid-1987. 
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